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Abstract
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has ordered tech
giants to police the app developers that use their
platforms, requiring them to remove apps that employ
deceitful sales tactics or violate consumer privacy. Tech
giants have often resisted FTC orders to police the
companies on their platforms because policing takes
significant resources and diminishes profits. But some
firms, after paying modest fines for neglecting
enforcement, have eventually complied with FTC
demands, removing predatory apps and banning
problematic developers. Other firms have continued to
shirk enforcement obligations at the risk of escalating
fines. What accounts for the differences? Using process
tracing to track decisions by Apple and Facebook, we
find that tech giants willingly police consumer fraud but
not consumer privacy violations. Failures to police
fraud leads to public complaints and negative press
attention, while failures to police data breaches often go
undetected by consumers, the media, and thus the FTC.
1. Introduction  
Overburdened as watchdogs, some federal agencies 
recruit industry-leading companies to conduct 
regulatory oversight on the US government’s behalf. 
Such companies, known as “enforcer firms,” are legally 
required to monitor the many business partners they 
work alongside and to make sure these partners operate 
in full compliance with the law [1]. If they shirk or 
ignore the oversight responsibilities imposed on them, 
enforcer firms can face serious penalties themselves—
even if they have committed no legal violations 
otherwise. In the case of the high-tech sector, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has ordered tech 
giants to police the app developers that use their 
platforms and social networks, requiring them to 
remove apps that employ deceitful sales tactics or 
violate consumer privacy. Big tech enforcers have 
tended to resist FTC orders because enforcement 
activities cut into their revenues [1], [2]. But some firms, 
after paying modest fines for neglecting oversight, have 
eventually complied with FTC demands, flagging 
predatory apps and permanently blocking problematic 
developers. Other tech giants, however, have repeatedly 
shirked enforcement requirements at the risk of 
escalating sanctions.  
What accounts for the differences in performance? 
To answer this question, we explore the principal-agent 
relationship between the FTC and two tech giants—
Apple and Facebook—tracking each company’s 
response to regulatory orders across a ten-year period, 
from 2010 to 2020. Initially, both firms decided to 
ignore the agency’s enforcement requests and let app 
developers commit ongoing legal and privacy 
violations. Apple allowed developers to trick children 
into making unauthorized in-app purchases on their 
parents’ accounts. Facebook, meanwhile, gave 
developers broad access to its users’ personal data, even 
after assuring users their information was protected. 
Eventually Apple complied with FTC orders in full, 
while Facebook committed ongoing policing failures. 
These differences among the companies are 
puzzling because both have similar advantages over the 
FTC and can easily commit to a non-enforcement 
strategy. With the technical capacity to conceal or 
misrepresent violations and with immense financial 
resources to absorb large fines, they can assume the 
risks of ignoring government regulators [3]. To explain 
differences in firm behavior, we use process-tracing 
methods to develop detailed case studies on Apple and 
Facebook, examining the terms of their enforcement 
requirements, documenting their interactions with the 
FTC, tracking their policing efforts over time, and 
identifying any intervening factors that help account for 
enforcer compliance and defiance. Public documents 
from both the government and the companies provide 
the necessary materials to assemble these case studies. 
In the end, we find that the nature of violations by 
app developers was the decisive factor in determining 
whether tech giants willingly conducted enforcement. 
When parents learned that their children had made 
unauthorized in-app purchases from billing statements, 
many of them complained to Apple about the charges. 
Their complaints gained the news media’s interest and 
the FTC’s attention, and soon after the policing failures 
of both firms were exposed. Moreover, Apple could 
reasonably anticipate that consumer complaints would 





only increase, and that FTC investigations would 
inevitably follow, if they continued to ignore the sales 
strategies of app developers. But when it came to 
fraudulent data-harvesting practices, there were no 
customer complaints or opportunity for such complaints 
to trigger investigations. Because data from Facebook 
were secretly retrieved, both the public and the FTC 
could not know the extent of the privacy violations or 
the level of neglect by the tech enforcer. Furthermore, 
Facebook could reasonably calculate that disclosure of 
its data practices was unlikely and that FTC orders were 
largely toothless. Our analysis thus offers one clear 
lesson: that without a predictable alarm mechanism, 
such as public complaints and press scrutiny, tech giants 
are unlikely to restrain their business partners, uphold 
privacy interests, and comply with federal requirements 
to enforce regulations. 
1.1 Recruiting Enforcer Firms 
We are accustomed to viewing the relations 
between government regulators and private firms as 
inherently antagonistic—and for good reason. The 
fields of law, economics, and political science have 
produced enormous evidence showing that similar 
conflicts play out across many different industries [4]–
[6] While federal agencies seek the best strategies for 
corporate enforcement, many firms seek the best 
strategies for noncompliance, regulatory capture, or 
both. But some companies, despite these adversarial 
conditions, are required to help federal agencies conduct 
regulatory tasks. These companies have been dubbed 
“enforcer firms” [1]. 
An enforcer firm is a large, industry-leading 
company that has been instructed by the US government 
to monitor and police some of the third parties it hires or 
does business with. On one level, the process of 
recruiting enforcer firms is rather straightforward. 
Congress simply passes legislation that grants oversight 
authority to a federal agency and the agency in turn 
delegates some of its authority to a major company. But 
there is some complexity to the delegation process, 
especially if a company resists or neglects its 
enforcement role. To start, an agency must find a 
statutory basis for compelling companies to monitor the 
commercial practices of their business partners. Once it 
has done so, the agency informs the companies of their 
new responsibilities and then investigates them 
periodically to make sure they are monitoring the third 
parties under their purview. If the agency finds serious 
or blatant lapses in enforcement, it can levy fines against 
a firm for delinquency and issue a legal order 
compelling the company to follow specific policing 
instructions. Major companies across industries—
including banking, oil, and high tech—carry out 
enforcement tasks for the federal government [1], [7]. 
Enforcers in each industry operate under the 
scrutiny of different regulatory agencies. For the high-
tech sector, the Federal Trade Commission serves as the 
main government watchdog. The FTC, as an 
independent regulatory commission, has the authority to 
investigate any commercial activities that are potentially 
“unfair or deceptive” (Federal Trade Commission Act). 
It also has the authority to investigate activities that 
potentially undermine consumer privacy, including 
online privacy [8], [9]. Under these two broad mandates, 
the FTC has required the largest tech companies—
including Apple and Facebook—to monitor third parties 
that use or sell products through the online platforms 
and networks these companies operate. The FTC has 
issued two types of orders along these lines. First, it has 
ordered tech giants to monitor their platforms for any 
predatory or fraudulent practices used by third-party 
developers to sell apps or other online products. Second, 
the FTC has ordered tech giants to protect the digital 
privacy of their users, even after having shared user data 
with third parties. This second order requires tech giants 
to audit third parties and determine whether they are 
maintaining the privacy and security of user data [1], 
[2]. 
As noted above, leading firms in other industries 
face similar legal requirements to monitor third parties, 
but their enforcement roles differ somewhat from those 
of the tech giants. Firms in other industries are mostly 
responsible for third-party surrogates that carry out 
services on their behalf. Credit card companies that hire 
independent call centers must make sure that these 
centers do not mislead customers about credit card fees 
and options. Similarly, oil companies that hire 
excavation firms must make sure that these contractors 
maintain safety and environmental standards on drill 
sites [1]. For tech giants, rather than monitoring 
surrogates, they police the use of their own networks, 
platforms, and data by other entities. Potentially, they 
can exert tremendous control over third parties that use 
their platforms, giving them unique advantages in 
enforcement. But as we shall see, simply because tech 
giants have special capacity to monitor and police does 
not mean they have sufficient incentives to do so. 
1.2 A Theory of Enforcer Compliance and 
Defiance 
Why would big tech firms carry out enforcement 
tasks on behalf of the FTC? The simple answer is that 
they have a legal obligation to do so. But legal 
obligation does not necessarily lead to legal compliance, 
either in full or in part. The dynamic between the FTC 
and big tech enforcers resembles a classic principal-
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agent relationship, where differences in goals, 
information, competency, and risks create conflicts 
between the two sides [10]. These conflicts reveal the 
many reasons why tech giants are likely to neglect their 
enforcement roles and allow third parties to violate 
consumer protections. 
Fundamentally, the FTC and big tech have 
divergent, even irreconcilable interests. The FTC, as 
principal, has the primary goal of establishing effective 
oversight of online platforms in order to protect 
consumers and their privacy. But the combination of 
decentralization and rapid, bottom-up innovation makes 
the high-tech sector an especially difficult industry for 
the government to monitor [11]. Since the FTC cannot 
feasibly track the thousands of app development 
companies in the US, or the hundreds of thousands of 
independent developers, it needs to adopt efficient 
shortcuts that provide oversight of the digital economy 
at a low cost. The delegation of enforcement tasks 
accomplishes this goal. By ordering tech giants to police 
their own industry, the FTC can spend more time 
monitoring other commercial sectors and exert less 
effort in developing the necessary expertise to monitor 
high-tech firms. 
But tech giants, as agents, have little or no interest 
in policing their business partners and would prefer to 
leave their platforms and networks unregulated for 
maximum profit [3]. Platform businesses, such as 
Apple, work to “bring together producers and 
consumers” with their mobile app stores and then rely 
on a high volume of exchanges to generate revenues [12, 
p. 58], see also [13]. They charge app developers a 
percentage of sales from the products sold on their app 
stores, and thus have a strong profit motive to increase 
the number of apps available to consumers. Meanwhile, 
social media companies, such as Facebook, sell access 
to their users’ data—often for and through targeted 
advertising—to third parties. The more data that tech 
giants collect on their users, especially on highly 
sensitive activities, the more valuable their data and 
targeted ads are to companies and app developers [14]. 
Given how their businesses are structured, tech giants 
are likely to see third-party oversight as detrimental to 
their bottom lines. 
The informational asymmetries that commonly 
exist between principals and agents operate between the 
FTC and big tech firms, providing further incentive for 
these firms to defy enforcement orders. Agency loss is a 
central problem for principals, since, generally 
speaking, agents have specialized knowledge and the 
means to withhold information for their own benefit 
[15]. One option in response is for principals to monitor 
agents directly, but doing so defeats the very purpose of 
delegating tasks [16, pp. 24–25]. Although the FTC has 
trained specialists to investigate tech companies, its 
workforce and budget are modest given its broad 
mission. For 2019, it had a $311 million budget and a 
staff of 1,100 to carry out all consumer investigations, 
in all commercial industries, not just those in the tech 
sector. Quite simply, the FTC often lacks the funds to 
launch major cases and finds itself outmatched by the 
army of lawyers and software engineers that these firms 
employ [17]. Tech giants likely realize that they can 
misrepresent their enforcement performance with little 
worry of the FTC catching on—especially because the 
government cannot readily recruit alternative enforcers 
to help overcome the asymmetries it faces in 
information and competency [18]. 
Moreover, the FTC faces graver potential 
consequences than tech firms do when enforcement 
failures occur, and this disparity in risks further 
incentivizes big tech to neglect oversight. Because of 
crisis or scandal, federal agencies can see their budgets 
cut, their mandates narrowed, and their leadership 
replaced or hallowed out [19]. Even an independent 
agency like the FTC—which, by design, is relatively 
insulated from political interference—can find itself 
targeted and penalized by politicians. In fact, political 
interference is increasingly common for such agencies 
[20]. The FTC has often found itself targeted by 
Congress over its regulatory performance, and 
legislators have threatened to shift oversight of the tech 
industry to other federal agencies [21], [22]. By contrast, 
tech giants face relatively miniscule fines for dropping 
the ball on enforcement and are unlikely to comply with 
FTC orders simply to avoid paying them. Fines in the 
tens of millions of dollars mean little to companies that 
earn hundreds of billions of dollars per year. 
To return to our original question, why would tech 
giants comply with FTC orders when they have so many 
incentives and opportunities to defy them? We expect 
that these firms will only conduct third-party policing if 
the informational asymmetries between them and the 
FTC have been resolved, or at least dramatically 
reduced, and thus the threat of penalty for lapses has 
increased by a considerable degree. To be precise, tech 
firms will monitor business partners on a consistent 
basis if an alarm mechanism is in place that predictably 
and broadly exposes enforcement failures and in turn 
alerts the FTC. Not only does a consistent alarm raise 
the likelihood of government sanctions against 
delinquent enforcers, but also, and perhaps equally 
important, it raises public awareness of lapses and 
potentially triggers a public backlash against those 
enforcers that have allowed serious commercial abuses 
on their networks and platforms.  
We see two sets of actors—consumers and the news 
media—playing a critical role in setting off alarms. 
When consumers lodge complaints against a third party 
for unfair or deceptive practices, the FTC learns that a 
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big tech enforcer has failed, to some extent, to monitor 
business partners; and when the news media covers such 
complaints, the FTC learns that the unfair or deceptive 
practices have been unusually severe, unusually 
widespread, or both. This kind of “fire alarm” 
mechanism, or “salience signal,” has proved effective in 
ensuring regulatory action, oversight, and compliance in 
other contexts [23], [24], and we expect that it is likely 
to do so here. Specifically, if big tech enforcers know 
that consumers and the press will likely notice the 
deceptive practices of their business partners, they will 
have strong incentives to police their partners and 
quickly halt any deceptions or scams.  
However, that also means tech giants can safely 
neglect oversight of third parties whose practices, even 
if highly problematic, are unlikely to be noticed by 
consumers or the news media. The absence of consumer 
complaints and news stories means the absence of an 
external alarm mechanism and thus little threat of 
investigation and public outrage. 
2. Methods and Data Sources 
In the remaining sections of this paper, we assess 
the plausibility of our enforcer theory against the 
empirical record. Specifically, we track the interactions 
between tech giants and the FTC to determine why 
companies followed or resisted government orders for 
third-party policing. Because firms have multiple 
opportunities to comply or defy and because the FTC 
has multiple opportunities to investigate and penalize, 
an examination of each company allows us to test our 
expectations repeatedly within cases and across time. 
An enforcer firm responds to an FTC request; the FTC 
responds to the performance of that firm; new business 
developments arise that create new enforcement 
demands, and so on. Given this ongoing dynamic, we 
use process-tracing methods to track causal mechanisms 
across time in order to explain the outcomes of interest: 
compliance and defiance of FTC orders [25], [26].  
We examine two firms—Apple and Facebook—
and thus construct two case studies to test our 
expectations. These companies, as part of the so-called 
Big Five tech giants, are directly comparable because 
they enjoy large revenues and market dominance in the 
same industry. In fact, not only do all three have 
considerable influence over app developers, but they 
also have the capacity to undermine, if not ruin, the 
fortunes of most developers simply by blocking access 
to their platforms or networks [27]. The FTC has 
imposed policing requirements on these companies for 
these reasons. Beyond these important similarities, we 
have decided to examine these firms because of two 
other considerations. First, and most important, these 
companies have demonstrated different levels of 
policing commitments and thus allow us to explore 
variation in the dependent variable. Second, these 
companies represent a mix of platform- and network-
based businesses, with Apple offering platform services 
and Facebook offering network access. These 
companies thus represent the dominant business models 
that drive much of the high-tech sector [13]. However, 
despite variation in services and products across these 
firms, both showed initial resistance to third-party 
enforcement, suggesting that differences in business 
models do not account for differences in policing 
behavior.  
The starting point for each case study is 2010—
roughly when the FTC first investigated tech giants for 
compliance failures or recruited them for policing—and 
the timespan for each case encompasses the same ten-
year period. By tracking firms over time, we can 
document not only their initial decisions to comply or 
defy but also their decisions to change behavior as a 
result of intervening events or shifting conditions. In 
using process tracing, we disaggregate each case into a 
series of salient episodes, see whether our causal 
mechanism is operating at each point in time, and 
determine whether its presence (or absence) has the 
hypothesized effect. Like Beach and Pedersen [28, p. 
34] we understand a causal mechanism to be a series of 
“links” or a chain of related actions that lead to a 
particular result. That means the primary work of 
process tracing is to unpack those links—to isolate the 
actions—and demonstrate how each one contributes to 
the outcome of interest. As we have hypothesized, big 
tech firms will only comply with enforcement orders if 
they are convinced that an alarm mechanism that 
reliably notifies the FTC of enforcement failures is in 
place. Any alarm that alerts the FTC will alert the broad 
public by extension, potentially setting off a public 
backlash that will only strengthen the Commission’s 
resolve to investigate and penalize. 
We expect this alarm mechanism to unfold across 
four steps: users must recognize that a third party has 
committed abuses against them; users must then lodge 
public complaints against the third party, thus revealing 
enforcement lapses by the tech firm; these user 
complaints must receive at least some media attention to 
broaden awareness and spur government action; and the 
firm must plausibly expect additional user complaints to 
be registered and further, more serious government 
action to be taken unless it launches and maintains 
enforcement practices. If one link or more is missing, 
lapses in enforcement are likely to be observed, since 
tech giants will have few incentives to police third 
parties in a regulatory environment that they view as 
weak. Importantly, we do not argue or expect that the 
absence of an alarm mechanism will necessarily lead to 
the absence of FTC investigations. The agency conducts 
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periodic checks on its own, receives whistleblower 
complaints from company insiders, and sometimes 
assists other government agencies in their 
investigations. We simply expect that the absence of 
predictable alarms will encourage tech giants to defy 
FTC orders. 
To construct our case studies, we draw upon 
multiple data sources—including government records, 
company statements, and press accounts, among others. 
Above all, we use materials from the FTC website, 
where the agency has compiled a full collection of 
enforcement orders, investigative records, consumer 
complaints, court judgments, and many other relevant 
documents pertaining to the tech firms. Our analysis is 
largely based on an exhaustive reading and appraisal of 
FTC files. The FTC provides detailed listings of all 
relevant case documents for both Apple 
(https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/112-3108/apple-inc) and Facebook 
(https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/092-3184/facebook-inc). Having laid out 
our expectations and research strategies, we turn now to 
our case studies. 
3. Apple  
We begin our investigation with Apple and its 
initial failure to identify and block predatory sales 
practices on its app store. This case provides strong 
support for our main claim—that outside actors, 
especially consumers and the news media—play a 
critical role in establishing a predictable alarm system 
and holding enforcer firms accountable. 
When Apple launched its app store in 2008, it 
focused on maximizing profits to the detriment of 
consumer protections. From the start, the company 
established its app store as the sole online marketplace 
for Apple customers to purchase applications for 
smartphones and tablets. The company also required 
app developers to pay 30% of their sales revenues to 
Apple in order to place their products on the app store. 
Apple claimed that its strict gatekeeping of apps was to 
ensure quality control, but this strategy also ensured that 
the company enjoyed large profits from the efforts and 
sales of app developers—about $5 billion a year [29]. 
To increase sales, Apple offered an in-app payment 
system that allowed users to download applications for 
free and buy optional, interactive features within the app 
itself. The in-app purchases were billed directly to the 
credit card associated with the device, speeding up 
transactions. However, Apple did not explain to 
customers how the new in-app purchasing system 
worked, nor did it set clear standards for app developers 
to follow for in-app offers. As a result, some app 
developers devised schemes to trick users into making 
unwanted in-app purchases [30].  
Most problematic, some developers targeted 
children with this strategy. They created free 
videogames—known as “bait apps”—that allowed 
children to buy things, unknowingly, while they played 
online. Children would commonly need to purchase 
items, such as snacks for a virtual pet or additional 
chapters in a story, to reach successive levels in a game. 
Although parents had to enter an Apple password on 
their device for children to finalize these purchases, 
neither developers nor Apple made it clear to parents 
that, by punching in their passwords, they were 
authorizing a credit card charge. Moreover, Apple failed 
to warn parents that any use of their password would 
open a 15-minute window during which children could 
make unlimited in-app purchases without additional 
parental action. In one case, a child spent $2,600 on the 
game Pet Tap Hotel; in another, a seven-year-old spent 
$500 on the game Tiny Zoo Friends. Over the next 
several years, consumers reported millions of dollars of 
questionable in-app purchases to Apple and various 
authorities [30], [31]. 
An informal alarm system began to develop in 2010 
and 2011 that brought public attention to children’s bait 
apps and began to reduce the informational asymmetries 
between Apple and the FTC. Specifically, consumer 
complaints over in-app purchases drew the attention of 
the news media, which in turn drew the attention of 
legislators and regulators. Major outlets—including 
CBS News, the Associated Press, the Washington Post, 
and the comedy program The Daily Show—ran stories 
about parents receiving surprisingly large credit card 
bills because of their children’s in-app purchases e.g. 
[32]–[34]. In response to these reports, three Democratic 
members of Congress formally requested that the FTC 
investigate platform providers and app developers for 
fraudulent practices [35]. Soon after, in early 2011, the 
FTC publicly announced that it would study the problem 
[36]. At the same time, disgruntled customers launched 
a class-action lawsuit against Apple in an effort to 
recover money from questionable app purchases [31]. 
Another important mechanism in the alarm system 
was added in 2012. That year, the FTC warned Apple 
and other tech firms that they needed to police third-
party developers on their app stores and to notify parents 
of any purchasing schemes that targeted children. In a 
public report, the FTC explained that platform providers 
needed to consistently notify all users about interactive 
features in children’s games. The agency noted that 
because Apple did not require third parties to inform 
customers in a clear, upfront manner, Apple was 
inviting and ultimately benefiting from predatory 
business practices. As the report explained, “This lack 
of enforcement provides little incentive to app 
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developers to provide such disclosures and leaves 
parents without the information they need. As 
gatekeepers of the app marketplace, the app stores 
should do more” [37, p. 3]. The report instructed tech 
giants—including Apple—to check whether apps on 
their platforms had interactive features and, where 
appropriate, to adopt warning measures that would 
prevent predatory or fraudulent in-app purchases. 
Rather than follow the FTC’s request, Apple 
continued its strategy of noncompliance and 
nonenforcement, allowing the problem of bait apps to 
worsen. While consumer complaints piled up, Apple 
claimed that it had no responsibility to provide clear 
terms of service as it defended itself against the class-
action lawsuit [38]. With its first report having little 
perceivable impact, the FTC conducted another study of 
the app industry and issued a second report in late 2012. 
Not only did the FTC find that Apple had neglected its 
enforcement obligations over the last year, but it also 
concluded that predatory in-app purchases had likely 
increased. The agency found that, on Apple’s platform, 
the proportion of children’s games that offered in-app 
purchases had jumped from 11% to 30% in just ten 
months, making it all the more likely for children and 
parents to be duped into buying costly extras [39, p. 18]. 
This report concluded with a sharp warning to platform 
providers: “FTC staff has initiated a number of 
investigations to address the gaps between company 
practices and disclosures” [39, p. 21]. 
At this point it was clear to Apple that an alarm had 
fully sounded—that the public, the press, and 
government were committed to exposing abuses in the 
app industry. Apple thus took steps the following year 
to address customer complaints, clarify in-app 
purchasing procedures, and regulate its app store. In 
February 2013, it decided to settle the class-action 
lawsuit with disgruntled parents rather than continue its 
public denial of responsibility [40]. Two months later, it 
started to provide users with explanations on how in-app 
purchases worked and, in early 2014, it developed a 
clear warning system that notified parents about the 15-
minute purchasing window each time a password was 
entered [30], [41]. These actions largely satisfied the 
FTC, but the agency took two additional steps to 
maintain pressure on Apple. First, it fined the company 
$32.5 million as compensation for affected customers 
and, second, it issued a standing, 20-year order that 
required Apple to continue the enforcement steps that it 
had already initiated [30].  
From 2014 onward, Apple followed FTC orders 
and conducted scrupulous enforcement of its platform, 
avoiding further investigations. Apparently, the 
company recognized that neglect would set off a new 
wave of customer complaints, negative media reports, 
and thorough government investigations. In fact, having 
learned this lesson, Apple then developed smartphones 
with easy-to-use parental controls that allowed users to 
block all in-app purchases, further reducing the 
possibility of predatory schemes against children [42]. 
 
Table 1. Timeline of FTC investigation of Apple 
Date Event 
Oct. 1, 2009 Apple introduces in-app payments 
(IAP). 
Dec. 9, 2010 Nationally syndicated news article 
published about children accruing 
high bills for their parents through 
Apple’s IAP [32]–[34]. 
Feb. 1, 2011 FTC investigation into IAP [36]. 
Mar. 2011 Growing consumer complaints about 
IAP, including class-action lawsuit. 
[30], [31]. 
Feb. 2013 Apple settles class-action lawsuit 
with parents [40]. 
Apr. 1, 2013 Apple displays on-device 
explanations about what IAPs are. 
Did not explain before this date [30], 
[37], [39]. 
Sep. 13, 2013 Further user interface changes made 
to clarify IAP process to consumers 
[30]. 
Jan. 15, 2014 - 
Mar. 27, 2014 
Apple’s agreement with the FTC 
was released and finalized. 
4. Facebook 
The case of Facebook presents clear evidence that 
corporate enforcement of third parties is repeatedly 
neglected when consumer complaints and other 
predictable sources of transparency are missing. When 
enforcer firms and their business partners can reliably 
conceal deceitful practices from the public and the press, 
they retain an informational advantage over the 
government and have little incentive to comply with 
FTC orders. 
Facebook’s enforcement lapse—allowing 
developers unauthorized and unregulated access to user 
data—was driven by profit motives. More than 98% of 
its revenues, roughly $70 billion a year, have come from 
advertising, especially from micro-targeted ads that 
appeal to narrow subsets of users [43]. For years, 
Facebook has collected profile information on its 
users—names, ages, locations, and any personal details 
shared with Facebook Friends, including educational 
attainment, work history, and political and religious 
views—in order to make perfect, or near-perfect, 
matches between users and ads. Initially, Facebook 
promised users that they could control access to their 
profile information and block third-party apps from 
collecting their data. But in December 2009, the 
company secretly changed settings that allowed third-
Page 2579
party apps to harvest data not only on a user who 
accessed their app, but also on all Friends in the user’s 
network, i.e., “Affected Friends” [44].  
Facebook’s decision here revealed its willingness to 
take legal risks. Indeed, at the very same time that the 
company started misrepresenting its data policy, the 
FTC made enforcement of digital privacy a stated 
priority. In 2009, the Commission held roundtable 
discussions with experts—including Facebook 
representatives—to gain greater understanding of the 
issues at stake. Then, in 2010, it released a public report 
that highlighted its new investigative priorities and 
warned companies that their data-sharing practices 
needed to “comport with their representations to 
consumers” [45, p. 52]. The next year, the FTC 
completed an initial review of Facebook and found that 
the firm had secretly overridden privacy settings to let 
app developers harvest data on Affected Friends. To 
address this violation, the FTC issued a 20-year order 
that required Facebook to provide users with accurate 
explanations on how it shared data. The order also 
stipulated that Facebook would now need to “verify the 
privacy or security protections that any third party 
provides” once Facebook allowed data access [44]. That 
is, the tech giant would need to operate as an enforcer 
firm and conduct regular data-security audits on its 
business partners. What stands out from this episode is 
that, absent a clear alarm mechanism, Facebook 
operated without apparent concern for being 
investigated or caught.  
Its new policing obligations, however, did not 
compel the company to change its behavior. In response 
to the FTC order, Facebook revised its privacy statement 
and alerted users that any data shared with Friends could 
be collected by third-party apps. But in 2012, just 
months after the FTC issued another, stronger order to 
Facebook, the company removed this disclaimer from 
its privacy policy while it still allowed third parties to 
access the data on Affected Friends [46]. It maintained 
third-party access, according to internal company 
records, because there was financial value in doing so. 
For example, apps that were denied access to user data 
tended to fail, thus cutting the number of products on 
Facebook and making the network less attractive to 
users [47].  
Beyond profit motives, informational advantages 
over users and the government encouraged the company 
to commit willful misdeeds. In 2015, Facebook secretly 
allowed dozens of app developers to harvest Affected 
Friends data on a continuing basis, ensuring that tens of 
millions of users were unknowingly sharing their 
personal information. Facebook did not vet these 
developers or check whether they handled data 
responsibly [46]. Moreover, even when the company 
learned that an app developer was violating consumer 
privacy—say, by selling user data to an ad network—it 
made little or no effort to stop abuses. Typically, in such 
cases, a Facebook privacy manager would call an app 
developer to seek assurances, but otherwise would take 
no actions to ensure privacy standards were met [48]. 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg specifically 
encouraged data sharing because he saw no risk of 
exposure. As he explained in a company email, “I think 
we leak info to developers but I just can’t think of any 
instances where that data has leaked from developer to 
developer and caused a real issue for us”; quoted in [47]. 
Since the public and the government had no obvious 
means of learning how Facebook secretly shared 
personal data, the company had no inducements to 
conduct third-party oversight.  
This neglect of enforcement led to the scandal over 
Cambridge Analytica, the British consulting firm that 
aided Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign. In 
2014, Cambridge Analytica offered to pay Facebook 
users a small sum to complete a personality test, 
ostensibly for academic research. After 270,000 people 
took the test, the company—contrary to FTC rules—
gathered extensive personal data on roughly 87 million 
Affected Friends. Many of these Friends were outside 
the United States, but Cambridge Analytical had enough 
data on 30 million eligible voters in the US to micro-
target ads in Trump’s favor based on psychological 
profiles that the firm constructed [49], [50]. A little-
noticed article on the company’s activities was 
published in 2015, but Facebook—already aware of the 
campaign operation—took no enforcement steps in 
response [51]. Two tech-focused news sites ran stories 
on Cambridge Analytica after Trump’s election win 
[52], [53], but again Facebook ignored its policing 
obligations. This is because the three reports, spaced 
fifteen months apart, failed to offer clear evidence of 
Facebook wrongdoing and therefore failed to mobilize 
the public or the FTC against the company. In fact, one 
story reported that “Cambridge Analytica [bought] 
personal data from a range of different sources” to 
develop its psychological profiles, and that it used the 
social media site simply to post ads [52]. An alarm was 
starting to sound at this point, but all the necessary 
components for an effective system—including public 
awareness of the relevant issues—were not yet in place 
to alter company behavior.  
Facebook only adopted its enforcer role and 
suspended Cambridge Analytica’s access to user data 
when a wave of news stories, based on insider accounts, 
revealed the depth of Facebook’s data breaches. In 
March 2018, major news outlets, led by the Washington 
Post and the New York Times, ran detailed, investigative 
reports that exposed the widespread data access that 
Facebook had given Cambridge Analytica and other app 
developers. These news reports, dozens of them within 
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a month, raised serious public concerns and prompted 
both Congress and the FTC to launch investigations into 
Facebook’s data-sharing practices [54], [55]. Only after 
these investigations were announced, and only after 
Facebook stocks plunged 8%, did Zuckerberg promise 
to rein in third-party access to user data [56]. To signal 
a commitment to enforcement, Facebook hired three 
highly regarded digital-rights advocates to work as 
privacy managers [57].  
Thus, it took extensive news coverage, strong 
public reaction (including from investors), and a 
committed government response before the tech giant 
recognized that it could no longer shirk oversight and 
privacy responsibilities. The alarm had finally sounded. 
In 2019, to ensure that an alarm system remained in 
place, the FTC imposed an unprecedent $5 billion fine 
against Facebook and ordered the company to undergo 
an independent privacy audit each year, with the results 
to be made public [58]. Here, the FTC established a 
formal oversight system to ensure that secret company 
practices did not evade public scrutiny. Paradoxically, 
the Commission’s plan was to rely on checks conducted 
by yet another set of agents to mitigate the problem of 
agency loss. 
 
Table 2. Timeline of FTC investigation of Facebook 
Date Event 
Dec. 1, 2009 Secretly changes user privacy settings 
that allow third parties to collect 
information contrary to privacy policy 
[44]. 
Dec. 2010 FTC issues report warning companies 
that all consumer data remain secure 
and private, consistent with any 
statements made to consumers [45]. 
Apr. 1, 2010 Facebook allows developers to collect 
data about Facebook App users and 
their friends (“Affected Friends”).  
Aug. 10, 2012 FTC orders Facebook to respect the 
privacy of users with mandated 
privacy reviews over 20 years [44]. 
Facebook alters privacy statement on 
web site to include disclaimer about 
sharing of data about friends [46]. 
Dec. 2012 Facebook removes disclaimer about 
sharing Affected Friends data [46]. 
Apr. 2014 Facebook claims that in a year no 
developer will have access to Affected 
Friends data [46].  
Apr. 2015 Sharing of Affected Friends data 
continues with select developers [46]. 
Mar. 2018 Major US newspapers publish reports 
about how Cambridge Analytica was 
able to access data on 87 million 
Affected Friends based on a 
personality quiz taken by 270,000 
people [49], [54], [55]. 
Jul. 24, 2019 Facebook was fined $5 billion by the 
FTC (23% of 2018’s profits) [59]. 
5. Conclusions 
Tech giants have an inconsistent record as enforcer 
firms. Both Apple and Facebook, as documented here, 
initially resisted FTC orders to stop app developers from 
making deceitful sales or violating user privacy. 
Pressure from the FTC eventually pushed Apple to 
police its app store, but similar pressure did not drive 
Facebook to protect user data. Why did Apple comply 
in full and Facebook not at all? In our view, the nature 
of third-party violations accounted for the differences in 
policing behavior. When app developers duped children 
into making in-app purchases, an informal alarm system 
quickly formed and alerted the FTC to enforcement 
failures. Disgruntled parents initially complained to 
Apple about questionable app charges, and when the 
tech giant ignored these complaints, parents sought help 
from news outlets. Stories about in-app purchasing 
schemes proliferated, pushing the FTC to investigate 
and ultimately fine Apple for negligent policing. 
Afterward, the company was motivated to conduct 
effective enforcement of its app store because any new 
consumer complaints would likely attract further press 
attention and sound the alarm again. By contrast, 
Facebook had no incentives to protect user data from 
third-party abuses because neither platform users nor the 
news media could discover the secret collection and 
mishandling of personal data. Since no alarm system 
could consistently ring for privacy violations, the tech 
giant allowed—and even encouraged—such violations 
to continue.  
Our findings suggest that the FTC can only expect 
tech giants to conduct consistent and effective policing 
of third-party practices when consumer complaints are 
an ever-present threat. Without such a threat, the tech 
giants face no inducements to enforce government 
regulations and have strong reasons not to. Above all, 
third-party enforcement requires them to act against 
their business partners and, in turn, check their own 
profit opportunities. As we have shown, tech companies 
have violated user privacy not only because it is highly 
lucrative and central to their business models, but also 
because it is hard to expose. The FTC, in recent years, 
appears to have learned this lesson from the Facebook 
case and now requires this firm to undergo regular 
independent audits to compensate for a lack consumer 
and media alarms. It remains to be seen whether these 
independent audits will compel enforcer firms to uphold 
privacy laws and follow FTC orders over the long term. 
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